Surveillance for Ebola hemorrhagic fever was conducted in the Democratic Republic of the Congo from 1981 to 1985 to estimate the incidence of human infection. Persons who met the criteria of one of three different case definitions were clinically evaluated, and blood was obtained for antibody confirmation by IFA. Contacts of each case and 4 age-and sex-matched controls were also clinically examined and tested for immunofluorescent antibody. Twenty-one cases of Ebola infection (persons with an antibody titer of §1:64, or lower if they fit the clinical case definition) were identified, with a maximum 1-year incidence of 9 and a case fatality rate of 43%. Cases occurred throughout the year, but most (48%) occurred early in the rainy season. Fifteen percent of contacts had antibody titers §1:64 to Ebola virus, compared with 1% of controls (P õ .0001). Results suggest that Ebola virus periodically emerges from nature to infect humans, that person-to-person transmission is relatively limited, and that amplification to large epidemics is unusual.
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The Ebola (EBO) virus was first identified in simultaneous (figure 1). Herein, we describe this surveillance system and the results obtained from it. outbreaks of hemorrhagic fever in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Sudan in 1976, where case fatality rates were 88% and 49%, respectively, and 602 persons were known to have been infected [1, 2] . The 2 viruses causing these outMethods breaks were later shown to be biologically and genetically Surveillance site. The Sud-Ubangi subregion, which is situated related but distinct; the difference in virus subtypes may acin the Zaire River basin, is covered by second-growth tropical rain count, in part, for the difference between case fatality rates in forest. More than 85% of the inhabitants live in small villages the two countries [3] . A second appearance of EBO virus in with populations of õ1500. These villages, which are in clearings, DRC was detected in 1977 when the virus was isolated from are surrounded by fields used for traditional farming. The inhabita 12-year-old girl in Tandala Hospital, a rural facility in the ants are farmers and hunters, who are regularly in contact with Sud-Ubangi subregion of northwestern DRC, Ç500 km from domestic and peridomestic animals that are raised as a food source Yambuku, which was the site of the first outbreak in DRC [4] .
in close proximity to households. Inhabitants are also frequently
The girl was admitted to the hospital with clinical signs and in contact with wild animals, which they hunt in the forest and prepare for eating or for storage in their villages. The economy is symptoms of hemorrhagic fever and died shortly after admisthus based on agriculture, livestock (goats, sheep, and poultry), sion. In this instance, strict isolation and barrier nursing methand hunting, with the main agricultural crops being maize, manioc, ods were implemented early, and there was no further hospital ground nuts, cotton, coffee, and palm for oil. Diseases endemic to transmission from this isolated case; however, investigation led the area include malaria, diarrhea, intestinal parasites, measles, to the identification of a probable related infection in a survivtuberculosis, onchocerciasis, malnutrition, goiter, and cretinism.
ing sister of this patient. A previous symptomatic infection in Three years after the isolated infection was reported from health facility identified a surveillance agent for that facility and supervised surveillance activities, using the following case definiTandala, an intensified 5-year surveillance system for hemortions for identifying possible, clinical, and probable cases: possible rhagic fever was implemented in the same geographic region case: no contact specified and presence of sudden-onset fever, a single bleeding episode, and any three EBO-defining symptoms (headache, myalgia, arthralgia, nausea or vomiting, diarrhea, and lumbar, chest, or abdominal pain); clinical case: no contact speciAppropriate informed consent was obtained from patients.
fied, presence of sudden-onset fever, three bleeding episodes, and protective material, and disinfectants were provided to the caretaker. At the same time, travel to and from the village was dediarrhea, and lumbar, chest, or abdominal pain [or all three]).
The surveillance agent regularly contacted peripheral health and creased to a minimum, and intensive information campaigns on the hemorrhagic fevers and their control were conducted throughsocial workers, including traditional healers and village leaders, who were requested to immediately report any patient who met out the village and in neighboring villages. Surveillance agents made follow-up visits every 3-5 days to ensure that appropriate the criteria of one of the three case definitions to a health worker at the health facility. Once a report was received by the health treatment was being provided and that isolation procedures were adequately maintained. These visits continued until 21 days after facility, an epidemiologic investigation was conducted. Patients were examined, a clinical history was taken, and a 10-cm 3 venous the recovery or death of the last person fitting the case definition, during which time patient contacts other than family and village blood specimen was obtained from all those who fit the case definition and from their family members. (Later, blood specimens controls were identified and interviewed and blood specimens were collected. were obtained from other patient contacts and age-and sexmatched village controls.)
A mobile surveillance team of 1 physician and at least 1 nurse and 1 health inspector regularly visited participating health faciliFor purposes of the epidemiologic investigation, a contact was defined as a person who lived in the same house as the person ties to provide technical and material support to the surveillance agent, to review the report form for completeness, and if necessary, who was reported to the surveillance system or as a non-household member who had visited or cared for the case. A village control to further assist in the epidemiologic investigation. A senior surveillance officer was based in one of the health facilities (the was defined as a person who lived in the same village and was of the same age and sex as but not a contact of the reported case.
Tandala Protestant Hospital) during the period of the surveillance to serve as coordinator and ensure that the system was implemented Four village controls were identified for each case.
When possible, surveillance agents ensured that patients who as conceived. Laboratory confirmation. Blood specimens collected from pafit one of the case definitions were transported to a hospital, where they were placed under isolation. When this was not possible, tients, contacts, and village controls were held at ambient temperature until clot retraction, after which the serum was decanted and patients were isolated in their homes, and palliative medication, During the epidemiologic investigation, 188 contacts of the 30 persons were identified who had symptoms that met one of the three case definitions. Among the 188 contacts, 28 had Results antibody levels §1:64; all were contacts of either the 18 persons with antibody titers §1:64 or the 3 persons with low-titer A total of 98 persons from 46 different villages were reported antibody who had died before the second blood specimen could to the surveillance system. Epidemiologic investigation of these be obtained, giving a maximum overall secondary attack rate cases determined that 30 (12 male, 6 female) of the 98 actually of 15% (table 2) . Four (14%) of the 28 contacts with antibody had symptoms that met one of the three case definitions. Detiters §1:64 were or had been sick with an illness with symptailed analysis was done on information obtained from these 30 persons, all of whom had provided at least 1 blood specimen, toms that met the definition of a possible case, and 24 (86%) Figure 2 . Fourteen localities in Sud-Ubangi subregion where 18 persons were reported with Ebola antibody titers §1:64 and 3, who fit clinical case definition but died before second blood sample could be obtained, were reported with low-titer antibody (õ1:64). 0  0  0  1  2  3  Clinical  0  1  4  2  4  11  Probable  0  2  5  0  0  7  Total  0  3  9  3  6  21 NOTE. n Å no. of surveillance reports investigated.
were or had been sick with an illness fitting the definition of large-scale outbreaks demonstrates, however, that amplification of transmission can occur when sporadic cases enter a hospital a clinical case.
A total of 137 villagers were selected during the epidemiowith poor public health practices, such as occurred in Yambuku in 1976 and Kikwit in 1995 [1, 8] . logic investigation as controls for the 30 persons who had symptoms that met one of the three case definitions. Among
The maximum overall secondary attack rate of 15% among contacts is similar to that of 16% found in villages surveyed these controls, 2 (õ1%) had antibody titers §1:64 (table 2) . The difference in frequency of antibody to EBO virus between during the Yambuku outbreak in 1976. It is also similar to the 13% secondary attack rate in the simultaneous epidemic in contacts and village controls was statistically significant (P õ .0001, x 2 ).
Sudan [1, 2] and in the 1979 outbreak in Sudan [9] . The 43% case fatality rate was similar to that reported from Sudan in A total of 51 contacts had cared for a case patient who was detected through the surveillance system. Among these 1976 (49%) and 1979 (60%) but much lower than that in DRC in 1976 (88%). contacts, 9 (18%) had antibody §1:64, as did 4 (7%) of the 58 who stated they had only visited a case.
Some individuals without a history of clinical illness compatible with EHF had low-titer reactions (õ1:64) to the IFA that was used in the 1980s. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to Discussion conclude that those persons who met one of the surveillance case definitions for EHF and who had antibody titers §1:64 The results obtained from the EHF surveillance that was were truly infected. That 30% of those who were judged to fit conducted from 1981 to 1985 in northwestern DRC suggest one of the three case definitions did not have antibody §1:64 that EBO virus caused sporadic infections that led to low levels suggests that other diseases can confound surveillance, and of secondary transmission. During the epidemiologic investigathey demonstrate the importance of laboratory diagnosis in any tions that followed each reported case, information about EHF hemorrhagic fever surveillance system. Because of its depenand about its means of spread was disseminated. This may dence on blood-sampling equipment and supplies and on the have prevented further transmission and thus led to the low cold chain, which must be respected to preserve sera until it levels of secondary virus transmission. The study design did is tested in the laboratory, such a system may not be feasible not permit an evaluation of the impact of this information over the long term. The collection, storage, and safe transportaon secondary transmission. Information from investigations of tion of specimens was a major problem during the 1981 -1985 surveillance; inadequate storage facilities and electricity failures often resulted in thawing and refreezing of stored sera. 
